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Abstract—Smart grid is controlled by an authority personnel who 
uses LAN or the internet to control it. By knowing this information 
any one from outside can control the smart grid using LAN or the 
internet. This process of hacking the smart grid control is known as 
aurora attack. The Aurora attack may pose a risk to rotating 
machinery operating under certain conditions on the electrical 
grid. The Aurora attack involves opening and closing one or more 
circuit breakers, resulting in an out-of-synchronism condition that 
may damage rotating equipment connected to the power grid. This 
paper focuses on the Aurora attack on a synchronous generator 
and the existing technology available to mitigate the attack. The 
root cause of the vulnerability is breakdown in security. The first 
level prevents the attack with sound security practices. The second 
level protects the equipment in the event that the security level is 
compromised. The equipment can be protected using wide-area 
synchronized phasor measurement and protection system and 
security considerations. 
Keywords—Aurora attack, Rotating Machinery, Out of 
synchronism,  Synchronized Phasor Measurement Unit. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The intent of the Aurora attack is to intentionally open a 
breaker and close it out of synchronism to cause damage to 
the connected generators and motors. Good engineering 
practice includes synchronism-check relays installed in the 
power system to prevent out-of-synchronism closing. The 
Aurora attack assumes that these relays could be hacked to 
defeat their purpose. When an out-of-synchronism close is 
initiated, the high electrical torque translates into stress on the 
mechanical shaft of the rotating equipment. This stress 
reduces the life of the rotating equipment and can destroy it. 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security worries that 
coordinated attacks could cause prolonged outages in large 
sections of the electrical grid. In order to initiate an Aurora 
attack, the attacker would need the following components: 
• Power engineering knowledge 
• Power system information 
• Hacking skills 
Now days, all the Circuit Breakers function using 
Intelligence Electronic Device (IED) based on Microprocessor 
(Fig. 1) 
 
Fig .1 Intelligent Electronic Devices 
 
II. BACKGROUND OVERVIEW 
A. Generator Protection in Existing System 
The Aurora attack seeks to exploit the opportunity to 
connect two electrical systems out of synchronism. This 
opportunity could arise from an unprotected system or a 
system not configured to recognize the threat of an Aurora 
attack. The Aurora attack seeks to take advantage of the time 
delay between a protective relay recognizing an out-of 
synchronism issue and the initiation of a protection action. 
Protective relays continuously sample the voltage and current 
of the power system and calculate other key protection 
information based on these samples. The relay must be able to 
separate a bad data sample from a sudden change in the 
measured variable. This process of sample verification and 
signal processing is referred to as filtering. One example of 
filtering is to average a number of inputs together and use the 
calculated average for protection decisions. This averaging 
process helps to smooth the signal, but it reduces the speed of 
the relay for recognizing sudden changes in the system. In 
order to keep the system connected and avoid separating 
based on variations in the power system; protection engineers 
also typically add time delays in the trip command sequence. 
These delays, either from signal processing or intentional 
design, open a window of opportunity for attack. As shown in 
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Fig. 2 [3], the Aurora attack is designed to open a circuit 
breaker, wait for the system and generator to slip out of 
synchronism, and reclose the breaker, all before the protection 
system recognizes and responds to the attack. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Aurora Window of Opportunity 
The window of opportunity can be narrowed by analyzing 
the response time of the generator and circuit breaker 
protection elements. 
B. Drawbacks of Existing System  
Traditional generator protection elements typically 
actuate and block reclosing within 15 cycles. Many variables 
affect this time, but the discussion in this paper uses this 
estimate for the Aurora window of opportunity Another 
contributing factor to why typical generator protection does 
not guard against an Aurora attack is shown in Fig.3  that the 
attack may not be initiated at the generator. By initiating the 
attack at a system tie point away from the generator, the 
synchronism-check element at the generator does not measure 
a difference between the two systems. This targeting of the 
tie-in breakers instead of the generator requires the protection 
engineer to expand the scope of typical generator protection to 
include the surrounding system tie points. 
 
 
Fig. 3 The Target of the Aurora attack is the grid tie in the circuit breaker 
III. THE PROPOSED SYSTEM 
C.  Phasor Measurement Technology 
Synchronized Phasor measurements have become a 
mature technology with several international manufacturers 
offering commercial phasor measurement units (PMUs) which 
meet the prevailing industry standard for synchrophasors. 
With the occurrence of cyber security problems and major 
blackouts in many power systems around the world, the value 
of data provided by PMUs has been recognized, and 
installation of PMUs on power transmission networks of most 
major power systems has become an important activity. The 
occurrence of cyber security problem in many major power 
systems around the world has given a new impetus for large-
scale implementation of wide-area measurement systems 
(WAMS) using PMUs and phasor data concentrators (PDCs) 
in a hierarchical structure. 
D.  Proposed System model block diagram 
 
Fig. 4 Model Block Diagram of PMU 
Data provided by the PMUs are very accurate and enable 
system analysts to determine the exact sequence of events 
which have led to the security crimes, and help analyse the 
sequence of events which helps to pinpoint the exact cause 
and malfunctions that may have contributed to the 
catastrophic failure of the power system. As experience with 
WAMS is gained, it is natural that other uses of phasor 
measurements will be found. 
IV. VULNERABILITY IS SYSTEM DEPENDENT 
The level of vulnerability to an Aurora attack is 
dependent on the configuration and operating characteristics 
of each system.  For example, if the generator is on a backup 
system or only operates when disconnected from the main 
system, there is little Aurora risk to the generator. Generators 
connected to the grid through a single tie line are the most 
likely targets. These systems only need a single circuit 
breaker compromised for an attack to be initiated. In cases 
where the generating facility and utility are owned or 
controlled by separate parties, the mitigation protection 
becomes more difficult.[1] These installations typically lack 
the communications links that indicate the tie-breaker 
position. Without this indication, the generating facility must 
evaluate protection schemes that only require local data. 
Single-tie generating stations are the applications most likely 
to benefit from an Aurora hardware mitigation device. 
Power flow is an important variable when assessing the 
Aurora vulnerability. For protection purposes, the risk should  
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be evaluated based on the power flow at the connection 
point. Systems can be broken into three groups as follows: 
Systems with own generation that also receive power 
from the grid. Systems like this may include industrial plants 
that create their own generation but still need to purchase 
power from the grid. 
Systems that approximately balance the power they 
generate with the power they need. The result is that little 
power is imported or exported. 
Systems that export power to the grid. The variations in 
power flow affect the ability and type of protection needed to 
detect an undesired disconnection. Each of these groups 
provides a different system     and vulnerability window. 
System evaluation should analyze an attack under each 
operating condition.  
V. VULNERABILITY TEST ON RELAY CHARACTERISTICS 
The transmission system protection relays plays important 
role in determining the network. If a fault on line persists for 
long duration without being detected and isolated then it may 
cause severe damage to the network security. Hence the 
settings of protection relays are made sensitive to detect even 
the weakest fault. These settings some time make relay 
vulnerable to false operation during remote fault or when the 
system is highly stressed. So the relay that was set properly 
for one network condition may become vulnerable to 
undesired tripping when network condition changes.  
VI. SYSTEM PROTECTION WITH  
SYNCHROPHASOR TECHNOLOGY 
Synchronized phase or measurements offer solutions to a 
number of complex protection problems. In general, phasor 
measurements are particularly effective in improving 
protection functions, which have relatively slow response 
times. For such protection functions, the latency of 
communicating information from remote sites is not a 
significant issue. Adaptive Out-Of-Step Protection is 
recognized that a group of generators going out of step with 
the rest of the power system is often a precursor of a complete 
system collapse. Whether an electromechanical transient will 
lead to stable or unstable condition has to be determined 
reliably before appropriate control action could be taken to 
bring the power system to a viable steady state. Out-of-step 
relays are designed to perform this detection and also to take 
appropriate tripping and blocking decisions. Traditional out-
of-step relays use impedance relay zones to determine 
whether or not an electromechanical swing will lead to 
instability. In order to determine the settings of these relays, it 
is necessary to run a large number of transient stability 
simulations for various loading conditions and credible 
contingencies. Using the apparent impedance trajectories 
observed at locations near the electrical centre of the system 
during these simulation studies, two zones of an impedance 
relay are set, so that the inner zone is not penetrated by any 
stable swing. 
Security-Dependability should be recognized that a relay 
has two failure modes. It can trip when it should not trip (a 
false trip) or it can fail to trip when it should trip. The two 
types of reliability have been designated as ―security‖ and 
―dependability ―by protection engineers. The existing 
protection systems with their multiple zones of protection and 
redundant systems are biased toward dependability, i.e., a 
fault is always cleared by some relay. [2] The result is a 
system that virtually always clears the fault but as a 
consequence permits larger numbers of false trips. High 
dependability is recognized as being a desirable protection 
principle when the power system is in a normal ―healthy‖ 
state, and high-speed fault clearing is highly desirable in order 
to avoid instabilities in the network. The consequent price 
paid in occasional false trip is an acceptable risk under 
―system normal‖ conditions. However, when the system is 
highly stressed false trips exacerbate disturbances and lead to 
cascading events. An attractive solution is to ―adapt‖ the 
security—dependability balance in response to changing 
system conditions as determined by real-time phasor 
measurements.  With three primary digital protection systems 
it is possible to implement an adaptive security–dependability 
scheme by using voting logic (see Fig.5). The conventional 
arrangement is that if any of the three relays sees a fault, then 
the breaker is tripped. More secure decision would be made 
by requiring that two of the three relays see a fault before the 
trip signal is sent to the breaker. The advantage of the 
adaptive voting scheme is that the actual relays are not 
modified but only the tripping logic responds to system 
conditions. 
 
Fig. 5 Adjustment of Dependability- Security balance under stressed 
system condition 
VII. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS TO MITIGATE  
AN AURORA ATTACK 
The Aurora attack can easily target systems that have 
little or no security. Take proper security precautions should 
be taken to protect the system from both physical attacks and 
cyber-attacks. Many technical papers are available to show 
proper methods of securing substations or communications 
networks. An electric utility communications system is 
typically isolated from the public Internet system. [1] This 
isolation provides one level of protection but is insufficient by  
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itself to prevent a cyber-attack. Any assessment of 
protection against the Aurora Vulnerability must start with a 
review of security measures. Proper security for any system 
must be  
viewed as layers of protection with security in depth. In 
order to execute a successful Aurora attack, the perpetrator 
must have knowledge of the local power system, know and 
understand the power system interconnections, initiate the 
attack under vulnerable system load and impedance 
conditions, and select a breaker capable of opening and 
closing quickly enough to operate within the vulnerability.  
In order to access a protective relay, the attacker needs 
physical or electronic access to the relay. Assuming the attack 
is initiated via remote electronic access, the perpetrator needs 
to understand and violate the electronic media, find a 
communications link that is not encrypted or is unknown to 
the operator, ensure no access alarm is sent to the operators, 
know all passwords, or enter a system that has no 
authentication. If a protective relay is used for the attack, the 
perpetrator also needs to be able to communicate with the 
relay to control the appropriate circuit breaker, understand the 
engineering needed to initiate a fast trip and close, and disable 
any logic and protection elements preventing fast open/close 
operations. 
Some basic security considerations include: 
 Know and secure all communications paths to your 
system assets. These paths include SCADA, energy 
management system (EMS), engineering access, report 
collection, maintenance, telephone lines, wireless, 
Internet, and interconnections and bridges between 
systems. 
 Use strong passwords. Make sure your equipment uses 
strong length and character passwords (e.g., weak: 
Webster, strong: M$i4fp&r). 
 Manage passwords. Do not use default passwords, change 
them periodically, change them when someone leaves the 
company, control them, and use different ones in different 
areas. 
 Practice ―need-to-know.‖ Keep your designs safe and 
secure. Limit access to system details to those who really 
need to know them in order to do their jobs. 
 Compartmentalize knowledge. Keep security information 
localized. Do not use the same security and passwords 
throughout the system or on multiple systems. 
 Review alarms and access activity. Know which users are 
on your system and why. 
 Guard your access tools. Keep laptop computers locked 
and encrypted. Keep system drawings in a secure location 
with restricted access. Know who has keys, and set up 
multiple  
 Levels of access. By initiating proper and prudent 
security measures, the Aurora vulnerability can be 
mitigated. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
System owners must contend with not only accidental 
faults to the system but also targeted attacks seeking to 
damage equipment. Proper security must become a standard 
operating policy. Implementing proper security, including 
system, information, access, passwords, and encryption, 
produces an effective barrier to the Aurora attack. Protective 
relay schemes were modeled using a real-time phasor 
measurement unit, and the results compared. While no silver 
bullet exists for perfect protection, this testing clearly shows 
existing digital relays with proper protection schemes offer 
protection against Aurora attacks. While the standard 
generator protection did operate well under most conditions, it 
did not operate in a timely manner under near balanced load 
conditions. Wide-area synchronized phasor measurement is 
the best one to mitigate aurora attack. 
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